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CHAPTER I c SUBJECTIVE:-;RELATIVE EPISTEMOLOGY 
-1-
Husserl's work, The Crisis of European Sciences 
and Transcendental Phenomenology*, contains a medley 
of philosophical themes. One of the central ones is 
the explanation of how subjective experience oan be 
basis of objective knowledge. l Any philosopher who 
proposed such an explanation of episteme must be pre-
pared to deal with its adjunctive problem of psychol-
ogism. By concentrating on Part III A of the Crisis, 
we will see how suooessfully Husserl was able to show 
that subjective experience could have universal objeo-
tive dimensionso 
John Wild oharaoterized psychologism as being the 
family trait of relativism, skepticism, idealism, and 
subjectivism, or any philosophy that makes reason de-
pendent upon something non-rational in character. 2 
* Hereafter referred to as Crisis. 
1 
see Edmund Husserl. The Orisis of European Scienoes 
and Transcendental Phenomenolo • trans. by David Carr 
Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970), p. 68, 
for his definition of objective knowledge as knowledge 
unconditionally valid for every rational subject. 
2 
John Wild. "Husserl's Critique of Psychologisma 
Its Historic Roots and Contemporary Relevance,·' Philosophic 
Essays In Memory of Edmund Husserl, ed. by arvin Farber (New York, Greenwood Press. 1968), p. 20 - 21. 
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Most commonly, this problem is created because reason 
is thought to be dependent upon human will. an absurd 
consequence whereby the universal is dependent upon 
the contingent. We will show that Husserl designed 
the transcendental reduction of the Lebenswelt as his 
final response to PsyChologism. 3 
We will begin by outling Husserl's background dis-
cussions as found in "Philosophy as Rigorous Science" 
and Part II of the Crisis of the psychologistic errors 
occurring during the course of the development of mod-
ern philosophy. These two selections provide a setting 
which show Husserl's discovery of the Lebenswelt to 
be a response to what he saw to be the potential psych-
ologistic error of his phenomenology. Second. we will 
closely examine the technique of investigating the Lebens-
welt in Crisis, Part III A. Third: we will asses the 
extent to which the particular solution of the Crisis 
was effective in eliminating the psychologistic doubt 
possible of transcendental phenomenology. 
The problem of psychologism to Which we are re-
ferring is not equivalent to the specifiC formulation 
of the problem in Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigations, 
trans. by J. N. Findlay (New Yorke HumanitIes 'ress, 
1970), p. 42. Psychologism, in that context refers 
to the claim that the empirical science of psychology 
ought to provide the basis for logic. When we use the 
term, "psychologism". we mean John Wild's broader defin-
ition. 
-3-
Husserlts life-long approach to the problem of 
psychologism was primarily epistemological. He was 
interested in providing a critique of experience as 
an effort to answer the question of whether the data 
of e~perience could provide an adequate basis eor ob-
jective knowledge. He was firmly convinced that objec-
tivity was directly given to subjectivity without also 
believing that objectivity was merely conventional. 
Consequently, the bulk of the phenomen~logical exer-. 
cises concerned the thematization of the knowledge 
situation by means of a technique of reflection. This 
reflection was to allow the phenomenologist to expet-
ience every objectivity in direct correlation with sub-
jective activities. Phenomenology can in this manner 
be called a subject-related epistemological approach. 
In "Philosophy as Rigorous Science", Husserl saw 
psychologistic epistemologies as a serious threat to 
philosophy. This was because he thought that philos-
ophy ought to be science, episteme, which "in its ideal 
perfection, it would be reason itself, which could have 
no authority equal or superior to itself."4 Here Husserl 
4 
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saw two basic types of psychologism effecting the devel-
opment of modern philosophya Naturalism and Historicism. 
Husserl saw Naturalism, the view that every thing 
that is belongs to the r'uni ty of spatio-temporal being 
subject to exact laws of nature P5 ; as the basic style 
of epistemology key for British empiricism and posit-
ivism. Proponents of the naturalistic stance claim 
that every object, to be known with certainty. must be 
measurable or mathematizable as if it were a spatial 
entity. This measurablility persisted as the criterion 
of objectivity, even though Descartes showed the ment-
al or the psychical to be mutually exclusive of spatial-
ly extended substance. Thereafter, it was difficult 
to give an account of mind. Naturalism deals with the 
psychical, mental, or subjective principles of the know-
ledge situation in the following ways. a) by straight-
forwardly reducing them to the physical, as John Locke 
did when considering mind to be a tabula ~ and ideas 
to be like physical events6• b) the psychical is con-
5 
Ibid" p. 79. 
6 
Husserl, Crisis, sm.. cit., p. 63. 
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sidered different from but parallel in operation to 
the physical, as in the manner by which the experimental 
psychologist looks for correlations between neurophys-
iological events and psychic events; c) positivism deals 
with the psychical or subjective by eliminating it en-
tirely from its study by means of an absolute ontology 
of facts (hypothesized sense data).7 To Husserl, the 
effect of these three attempts was to "naturalize" rea-
son, consciousness, and ideas by making them dependent 
upon contingent psycho-physical activity.8 For Husserl, 
these were absurd consequences because reason, conscious-
ness and ideas had a universal status which made them 
contributors to to episteme. Naturalism reduces or 
eliminates the subjective elements because they are 
thought to frustrate the goal of objective knowledge 
in the form of mathematical exactitude, by introducing 
the doxic elements of personal whim and deceit. Yet, 
for Husserl, any form of naturalism could not result 
in objective knowledge because they could all be shown 
to be psychologistic. 
7 
Jurgen Habermas, Knowledge and Hyman Interests, 
trans. by Jeremy J. Shapiro (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), 
p. 8.3. 
8 
Husserl, "Philosophy as Rigorous Science," ~. cit., 




Proponents of historicism, by supporting "the rel-
ative justification of 'every philosophy for its own 
time"9, do not beleive episteme to be possible. Though 
this view reduces all to spirit. the subjective princi-
ple, it understands this principle to be human or cul-
tural, and not universal. Husserl saw epistemologies 
of this kind as being psychologistic because they re-
duced philosophy to anthropology or history. 
It is true that Husserl worked within the legacy 
of Cartesian dualism, but he did not by-pall its epis-
temological difficulties. Instead, ever since the Log-
ical Investigations, he had faced up to the bipolarity 
of the epistemological situation, that it involved an 
irreducible correlation between subjective principles 
and objective principles. Husserl freely admitted that 
the apprehension of an object very often involved the 
conjunction of temporally situated subjeotive acts and 
atemporal objects (ideas). The paradigmatic illustra-
tion would be the operation of counting and the objeot 
number.l~usserl, however. restrained himself from the 
9 
Ibid., p. 77. 
10 
Peter Kostenbaum, intro. to Huseerl's Paris 
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psychologistic trap of claiming that subjective opera-
tions cause ideas. The investigations of Descartes sug-
gested to Husserl the psychologistic problem in a nut-
shell, as lithe problem of how rational structures en-
gendered in my own reason (my own clara !1 distinctae 
perceptiones) can claim an objectively true, a metaphys-
ically transcendent validity."ll Husserl's response 
to this problem took the general form of claiming that 
the perceptiones, or what is given to subjectivity. 
were immanently rational12 ; that is, the essence of 
what is was straightforwardly given in experience. 
For that reason Russerl's approach differed significant-
ly from the epistemological studies of both Hume and 
Kant, which also began from the given in experience. 
For Rume, one of the dominant characteristics of 
the perceptions of feeling and thinking, respectively 
impressions and ideas, was flux - one perception suceed-
Lectures, trans. by Peter Koestenbaum (The Hague. Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1964). p. xxix. 
11 
Husserl, Crisis, QQ. cit., p. 81. 
12 
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ed another. For this reason, the true apprehension of 
essence (the self identical nature of an object that 
persists through all its appearances) was impossible. l ; 
The illusion of identity was preserved ~or Hume by the 
fiction ( a notion without corresponding impressions 
or ideas) of substance or matter.14 That Hume made 
of identity an invention of the mind led to what Husserl 
called the ,bankruptcy of objective knoWledge15, the 
impossibility of directly apprehending the unchanging 
self-identical form of an object given in the flux of 
its appearances. In contrast to Hume, HUSSBrl aimed 
at showing that essence intuition was possible, that 
the identical nature of a succession of appearnaoes was 
somehow given to subjeotivity. 
On a different tact, Kant showed that what is giv-
en (sense data) were rationalized due to the pure forms 




David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed by 
L. A. Selby-Bigge (Clarendon. Oxford University Press, 
197;), p. 219. 
15 
Husserl, Crisis, 2Q. oit •• p. 88. 
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standing, making the apprehension of the essential char-
aoteristics of any object possib1e.16 Husser1 was dis-
satisfied with Kant's proposed solution because it fos-
tered the psycho10gistic separation of rational norms 
and sensibly intuitable data, instead of showing the 
intrinsic relation of reason to intuition in experienoe. 
The result of Kant's position was that sensibility pro-
vided the data from the ··outside" world which were ex-
ternally logicized by the categories of the understand-
ing. Since the oategories of the understanding and the 
pure forms of sensible intuition seemed to Husser1 to 
model closely the parameters of mathematized nature, 
the implication was that prescientific experience was 
non-rational. In this manner, Kant depicted reason as 
being dependent on the contingent cultural event of 
the birth of the positive soiences. Husser1 wrote of 
resulting position. 
16 
Natural Science is. to be sure, not 
purely rational in so far as it has 
need of outer experience. sensivi1ity, 
but everything in it that is rational 
it owes to pure reason and its set-
ting of norms. only through them can 
there be rationalized experience. As 
Ibid., p. 93 
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for sensibility, on the other hand, 
it had generally been assumed that 
it gives rise to the merely sensible 
data, lrecisely as a result of affec-
tion from the outside. And yet one 
acted as if the experienoiable world f 
of the prescientific man - the world 
net yet logicized by mathematics - was 
preglven by mere sensibility. 17 
The characteristics of the epistemic ought to precede 
rather than follow what is called natural science. 
Husserl attempted to rectify the psychologistic problems 
of the epistemologies of Hume and Kant by first broad-
ening the notion of phenomenon. Phenomena for Husserl 
were not merely the sense data from the "outside" world, 
but more generally were the givenness of any object, 
real or ideal, to awareness. Husserl also considered 
subject and object solely in terms of their functions 
for the epistemological situation. As a result, the 
subject was not a mental subjeot or mind or rational 
faculty, but consciousness of an object. The object 
was considered in a non-material fashion as givenness 
to consciousness. Subject and object were not causal-
ly related but intentionally related, so that for each 
act of consciousness there is presented something, e.g., 
an object in space, mumber, image, idea, etc. Accord-
17 
~ •• p. 93 
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ing to Aron Gurwitsch, intentionality is best under-
stood as the objectivating of consciousness. 18 Objec-
tive universal knowledge, for Husserl, in a further 
anti-psychological measure. was not concerned with the 
factual existence of the outside world, but with the 
truth and validity or Sinn of the world. l9 In this 
way. essence could phenomenally be given to conscious-
ness by means of its objectivating principle of intention-
ali ty, as the ideal atemporal unity or the",.meaning of 
an object given in an indefinite number of presentative 
acts. 20 Universal knowledge was experientially pos~ 
sib1.$ C', for Husserl because essence'S can be found a.mong 
the data directly given to awareness. 
That essences could be given phenomena.lly might 
prove experience to transcend doxic - relativist opin-
ion. but is not Husserl's concept of essence psycholo-
gistic? John Wild a.nd Herbert Marcuee think tha.t it 
is, but Husserl was hardly the originateI' of this trend. 
18 
Aron Gurwi tsch ll "On the Intentionality of . Con-
sciousness." Philosophic ~ssaxs in Memory of Edmund 
Husserl. 2R. cit., p. 66. 
19 
Husserl, Crisis, ~. cit., p. 96. 
20 
Gurwitsch ll "On the Intentionality of Consciousness," 
2n- cit., pp. 76 - 82. 
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Essence. once ontologically characterized by Plato and 
Aristotle as the self-identical form of a thing that 
persisted through all ita changes. as a result of ant-
acolastic Cartesianism, became a name for the ubiqui-
tous characters of all intellectual possibilities. 2l 
However, Husserl believed that he was overcoming psych-
ologism by showing that experience has ubiquitous char-
acteristics by means of which essence is given. He 
thought that a non-substantial. non- anthropomorphic 
characterization of subjectivity would emerge by invest-
igating the universal style of givenness of the phenom-
ena themselves. 
Husserl was well aware of how easily the account 
of his investigations would fall into the logical ab-
surdities of psychologiam (that the subject invents 
objects, for example), especially if he did not take 
pains to differentiate the intentionality of the em-
pirical subject. which is volition, from the intention-
ality of the transcendental subject, which is the object-
ivating function. Consequently, Husserl saw that his 
21 
See John Wild's discussion of principle VII of 
Descartes· Principles of Philosophy, "Husserl's Critique 
of Psychologlsm: Its Historic Roots and Contemporary 
Relevance," !U2- cit •• p. 39 and Herbert Marcuse. "The 
Concept of Essence." Ne ations~ Esss s in Critical Theor • 
trans. by Jeremy J. Shapiro BostonaBeacon Press, 1963), 
p. 46 - 478 
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investigatiens of:the universal characteristics of phen-
omena required a different attitude or point of view 
from the one of everyday life. Husserl called this 
everyday attitude the natural or mundane attitude. 22 
The key characteristic of this attitude is that the hum-
an subject remains wholly ignorant of the intentional 
structure of objectivity. Objects tend to appear ·out 
there" as if they were alienated from subjective oper-
ations. Husserl would substitute this with another 
fixed style of willing called the theoretical attitude. 
which is a reflection upon experience, to reveal the 
subjective "constitution" of each object. real or ideal. 
according to intentionality,,2) The important thing 
about this reflective attitude was that it demonstrated 
that subjective operations were not produced ~ nihlo 
by it, but rather by means of this attitude subjective 
operations thematically show themselves that they did 
happen to shape these objects that one has experienced. 
However. the theoretical attitude did not reveal trans-
22 
HUllserl, "The Vienna fecture," Crisis, ~ cit., 
pp .. 280 -289. 
2) 
Enzo Paci, The Function of the Sciences and the 
Meaning of Man, trans. by Paul Piccone and James Hansen 
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1972), pp. 10) - 109. 
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cendental subjectivity as a thematic object. All that 
it did was reveal a system of intentional correlations 
that were neutral in terms of personal or cultural re-
lativities which formed the sense (§!nn)of the world 
of experience (the Lebenswelt). An important step in 
Husserl's change of focus from the natural attitude 
to the theoretical attitude was his realization that 
the scientific outlook of the natural sciences was not 
a truly theoretical attitude because it dealt with nat-
uralized objectivity - objectivity that was viewed as 
alien to subjective constitutlon.24 
The phenomenologist, in an effort to bring about 
the theoretical attitude, tries to put out of commisslon 
all the presupposed theories the "unconsciously" shape 
his experience in order to have only the data bafore 
his awareness. This technique of epoche is a necessary 
step on the road to examining the intrinsic traits of 
" phenomena because it is a way of aveiding cliche ap-
proaches to what happens in human experience. Clearly, 
focusing upon the data of experience thematizes the 
intentional structure of objectivity (givenness to a-
wareness). First person contitution also had another 
24 
Husserl, Crisis, 22' oit., p. 13. 
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virtue for Husser1. He was assured that objective cer-
taintity did not come from mathematizability but from 
first person givenness or self-evidence. Husserl found 
this to be the achievement of Descartes' Meditations, 
Thus my whole life of acts - ex-
periencing, thinking, valuing, etc. -
remains, and indeed flows on, but 
what was before my eyes in that life 
as 'i~~he" world. having being and val-
idity for me, has become a mere phen-
,'\ omenon and this in respect to all det-
erminations proper to it. In the epohh' 
all these deteterminations. and the 
world itself, have been transformed in-
to my ideae; they are inseparable OOM-
ponents of my cogitationes,precisely 
as their cogitata. 25 
That is, since one can doubt the existence of an object, 
existence is a presupposed characteristic of experience: 
while the fact that one cannot doubt the cogito-cogitatum 
structure of objectivity shows it to be an objective 
certainty. 
This first chapter has attempted to show that 'I." 
Husserl was aware that psycho1ogistic epistemologies 
made objective knowledge, episteme, a logical absurdity. 
Yet Husserl, by realizing that subjectivity was correl-
ative with objectivity, faced up to the psychologistic 
problem. We have also discussed some of the general 
25 
Husserl. Crisis. ~. cit., pp. 77 - 78. 
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precautions that Husserl took tQ insure that his sub-
ject-related epistemology need not be psychologistic. 
These were that all investigations were to be based on 
apodictic data by refraining from relying on presuppos-
itions. that data not be unduely restricted to sense 
data, thus eliminating the implication that ideas result 
from the outside world impinging on the mind. that phen-
omena, though in flux, can yield essence in the form 
of Sinn, and, finally. the attempt to differentiate the 
empirical subject from the transcendental subject. 
In Chapter II we will discuss why Husserl could 
claim that the "situation" of subjectivity in correla-
tion with the Lebenswelt was the universal and neces-
sary basis of scientific knowledge. We will try and 
understand how Husser, without committing the psychol-
ogistic error, built his case. 
CHAPTER I I c THE LEBENSWELT 
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As we saw in Chapter I, Husserl's diagnosis of 
the problem of psychologism involved inventing a method 
of "seeing" the universal aspects of phenomena. Husserl 
believed this tact would eliminate the mechanical epis-
temologies of external data impinging upon the mind 
or of mind imposing universal categories to form ag~ 
gregates of data. In the Crisis, Husserl examined the 
universal field of all actual and possible phenomena 
which he called the Lebenswelt. This field included 
everything of which one can be aware. It was there-
fore not restricted by the dimensions of space, time 
and causality. as was the world of natural science. 
Husserl illustrated this universality of the Lebenswelt 
by claiming that it also included the phenomena of pre-
sci~ntific experience. 
After showing that the dimensions responsible for 
the coherence of the "natural" world of the sciences 
were the result of the development of arbitrary con-
ventions. Husserl had to find an explanation for the 
universality of the dimensions of the Lebenswelt. 
Husserl oonsidered phenomena to be arranged in a univ-
ersal field because of thir ability to convey meaning. 
The specific psyohologistio threat that the Crisi! 
seems to have been designed to meet was that the ob-
jective world may be simply a personal invention of 
-19-
meaning. This charge must be cleared by any thinker 
who claims that indubitable knowledge of universals 
can be based on subjective experiences. The question 
to be answered was, in Husserl's werdsr. 
. ," ;." ,', " ~ \ 
how, througb •• tt'.e alteration of 
relative validities, subjective ap-
pearances and opinions, the coher-
ent, universal validity world - the 
world - comes into being for us. 26 
This chapter will illustrate Husserl's attempt to over-
come psychologism by showing that transcendental sub-
jectivity is the functional prerequisite for there be-
ing a universal field of phenomena. 
Part III A of the Crisis helps us become aware 
that the meaning of the world in its totality is pre-
given or preintended before any individual subject ap-
prehends any object, whether real or ideal. If we try 
to grasp the Lebenswelt as if it were one object, it 
becomes a thematic objeot for us. Everything that can 
be intuited (Anschaubarkelt)27would then be!!!n as 
all organized in the Lebenswelt according to the inten-
26 
Husserl, Crisis, .2:2. cit., p. 144. 
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tionality of a transpersonal subjectivity. 
Since in everyday life the intentional structure 
of world apprehension remains hidden to us, it is nec-
essary for the phen~menologist to adopt a new outlook -
the theoretical attitude. To the consciousness of hu-
man subjects engrossed in everyday life (Husserl's nat-
ural attitude), the world seems only to be "out there" 
in relation to subjective intuitions.28 It is easy to 
see that a psychologistic epistemology could result 
from this position - ideas could be considered the 
products of the causal interaction of mind with the 
"external" world. Husserl would also suspend the the-
ories of the natural sciences beoause of their claim 
that intuitive experience is not univocal insofar as 
it varies from person to person. Mathematical entities, 
the true objectivities for the natural sciences, have 
two drawt.cks which Husserl's search for the intention-
al structure of the Lebenewelt would override if suc-
cessful. First. mathematical entities are not in prin-
ciple experienceable.29 Second. the mathematical form-
28 
Ibid., p. 145. 
29 
Ibid., p. 51. 
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ulation of the coherence of the natural world is mere-
ly a presupposition of Western culture. The analysis 
of the coherent organization of phenomena in a lebens-
!!!1 in terms of intentionality would at least apply 
to all men in all time periods.. In addition, all find-
ings concerning the universal structure of phenomena 
would be directly grasped by the theoretical attitude 
and verifiable according to first h~ evidence. 
It is a difficult task to bring the Whole of the 
Lebenswelt before one's awareness as ene thematic ob-
ject. Ordinarily, phenomena appear to us in a succes-
sion of data. The method of Husserl's theoretical at-
titude begins with a reflective view of this succession 
of phenomena. Enzo Paci described Husserl's reflection 
upon the data of awareness as an attempt to relive in 
the first person each item of experience as well as 
its mode of apprehension. 30 This means that we would 
perceive all possible objects of awareness as if we 
were experienceing them for the first time. We would 
then re-experience the intentional structure of every 
object of experience. We wo~~d then realize that every 
cogitatum.is self-evidently accompanied by a cogito. 
30 
Enzo Paci, The Function Of the Sclencesand 
th! MeaniPlofMan, ,2;2. cit., p.4. 
... 22 ... 
During the oourse of the displaoement of the natural 
attitude for the theoretioal attitude we learn that an 
objeot is not just an existent but oan be more readily 
classified as Seinsgeltung or meaning-givenness. 
Seinsgeltung, translated roughly as "being oounting 
for us", was Husserlts word for the ubiquitous oharac-
tel' of all actual and possible phenomena given to in-
tentional oonsoiousness. The methods of transoendent-
al phenomenology strove to thematize the data of exper-
ience in their natures as Seinsgeltungen., To aid phen-
omenologioal refleotion, Husserl advised that all meta-
physioal, existential or theoretioal presuppositions3l 
about reality be suspended. These presuppositions were 
thought by Husserl to hide the intentional structure 
of objeotive knowledge. This they did beoause, though 
they did shape the meaning of our experienoe. we were 
not explioitely aware of the data immediately present 
to oonsciousness which would support thEuJe olaims 1\ 
In oontrast, the refleotive method deoided to foous 
upon whatever data oame from one's own oonsoious aots. 
Husserl hoped that this would be a way of proving that 
31 
Eg., a metaphysioal presupposition - God oreated 
the world. Eg., an existential presupposition - the 
world exists out there. Eg., a theoretioal presuppos-
itien - the world is a spaoe-time oausal matrix. 
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intentional directedness is an intrinsic trait of phen-
omena. 
This task could not, however, be acoemplished mere-
ly through ooncentration upon the apodicticity of one's 
own oonscious acts. He had to demonstrate that knowing 
subjectivity, regardless of personal quirk or cultural 
taste, apprehends in the same way. The Lebenswelt 
could then be the intentional structure that was the 
univooal ground of objectivity. 
The next step of the phenomenological method there .... 
fore involved purging the data from reflection upon 
one's own intuitive acts of their idiosyncratic traits. 
It must be possible to arrive at the characterization 
of the universal from the 'particular case, lest the 
universal admits of the exoeption of one's own exper-
ience. The universal or eidos was made thematic by 
means of the conceptualization of an ideal unity of 
all avtual and possible cases by the technique of free 
variation. Husserl called the type of universal he 
was trying to make an object for study "eidetic", to 
distinguish it from being merely a generalization from 
experience, the mean average of a number of particular 
cases. 
Free variation is a way of conceptualll·~ taking . 
each phenomenon of experience out of its place in the 
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natural sequence of one's experiences so that it can 
be compared with any other phenomenon. In his Carte-
sian Meditations, Husserl used the technique or free 
variation to show that spatial-temporal existence was 
not an eidetic trait of objectivity.32 It was not so 
because it is possible 12 conceive 2i an objeot which 
does not exist, like the space ship to Jupiter, for 
example. Meaning-givenness, on the other hand, remains 
an eidetic trait of objectivity because it is not pos-
sible to conceive of an object Which conveyed no meaning 
(Sinn) to consciousness. The eidos of perception, ao-
cording to this test, became Seinsgeltung. Seinsgeltung 
was an apt characterization because every perception 
is necessarily a meaning-givenness. Every actual per-
ception can thereby be regarded as an example of an 
ideal type - Seinsgeltung. 
Free variation was also used in the Crisis to them-
atize the ubiquitous traits of the Lebenswelt. In this 
way Husserl hoped to differentiate his concept of the 
Lebenswelt from the popular concept of Weltanschauung. 
The Lebenewe1t was to be much more than a generalization 
from experience by being the eidos of intuitive exper-
32 
Edmund Husser1, Cartesian Meditations, trans. 
by Dorian Cairns (The Haguea Martinus Nijhoff, 1960), 
pp. 17 - 19. 
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ienoe. The teohnique of free variation showed Husserl 
that every item that we confront in first person exper-
ience was inherently conneoted to other possible intu-
itive data. The implication was that the sequential 
flux of cogito-cogitatum has an inner coherency given 
to it. Ludwig Landgrebe oalled this eidetic property 
of the Lebenswelt that property of being co-meant.)) 
He gave the example that while intentional conscious-
ness is explicitly focussed upon the viewing of a table, 
the table's location in the room, the room's location 
in the house, and the house's location on the street, 
are all co-meant. These additional appearances are 
possibilities that could be actualized at any moment 
if we only ftlooked" for them. 
These co-meant possible appearances, though not 
explicitly present to oonsciousness, effect the sense 
of the actual presentation before one's consciousness. 
They form a horiqon of meaning which extends to all 
dimensions of the Lebenswelt.)4 In other words, in a 
way, the Whole of the Lebenswelt accompanies each in-
dividual cogitatum. Because the phenomenological me-
thod lets us view the world as a univocality of mean-
3) 
Ludwig Landgrebe, "The World as a Phenomenolog-
ical Problem," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 
I (1940 - 41), p. 39. 
-26-
ing rather than a universal field of existents, we are 
able to realize that the meaning of the world surpasses 
the data given to our own individual oonsoiousness. 
That the horizons of the Lebenswelt are infinite and 
yet intended in totality showed Husserl that the explan-
ation for the delineation of the range of possibilities 
lay in a universal intentionality. Landgrebe wrote. 
In brief the world is the horizon 
of our total attitude - the later 
being understood as our intention-
al direotedness in all our diverse 
acts. 35 
Husserl's argument for universal intentionality 
took the form that if the cogitatum were infinite, then 
the oogito had to be infinite. The LebenS!elt, by be-
ing the totality ofSetnsgeltyngen. could not be the 
product of any one person's cognitive operations. Never-
theless, data presented to Dne's individual consoious-
ness acoording to one's consoious activities were de-
monstrated to be related to all other possible Seins-
gelyungen in terms of intentional directedness. To 
thematize this inner "logicity" of the totality of act-
34 
Husserl, Crtsis, 22. cit •• p. 162. 
35 
Landgrebe,"The World ••• ". ~ cit., pp. 41 - 42. 
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ua1 and possible phenomena, Husser1 designed the ex.r-
cise of transcendental reduction. This method involved' 
attempting to make the whole of the Lebenswelt appear 
before one's awareness as if it were one phenomenon. 36 
It would seem that the attempt at transcendental 
reduction accomplished two signifioant things. First. 
its impossibility demonstrated that the Lebenswelt I, 
could not be a product of indiviaua1 cognitive activ-
ity. Husserl seemed to conclude that since one could 
not bring the totality of the tebenswelt before one's 
c.onsciousness, and yet phenomena coherently connect 
themselves with other phenomena, one's conscious acts 
were not responsible for the coherent meaning of the 
Leben§w,lt. The intentional structure of intuitive 
experience was shown to surpass one's cognitive act-
ivity due to its structure of infinite horizons. That 
this state of affairs was made evident by means of the 
theoretical attitude must be the reason that Husserl 
called it the attitude "above the pregivenness of the 
validity of the worldN • 37 The intentional directed-
36 
Husser1, Crisis, 22' cit., p. 152. 
37 
Ibid., p. 150. 
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ness of the totality of phenomena was shown to be of 
another order than personal volition. It was by means 
of the transcendental reduction that Husserl was to 
clear phenomenology of the charge of psychologism. 
Se.oond * the transcendental reduction oould be 
thought of as being responsible for a kind of distor-
tion. This method could lead to an abstraotion of the 
intentional direotedness of the Lebenswelt to make of 
it the ego or transoendental subjeotivity. The trans-
oendental reduction accomplished this result in the 
name of finding a prinoiple of explanation for the co-
herency of the flux of data present to one's awareness. 
While eaoh phenomenon is present to natural awareness 
by means of the oogito-oogitatum structure, the whole 
of the Lebenswelt is given by means of the transcend-
ental reduotion as the structure ~~oogit9-oogitatum.38 
The ego was merely a ubiquitous pole of experienoe39 
whioh, along with the oogito and oogitatym, made up 
38 
Ibid.,p. 170. Ego- universal intentional dir-
eotedness of the phenomena themselves. Cogito - acts 
of apprehension. Cogitatum - object of apprehension. 
39 
Koestenbaum, intro. to Russerl's Paris Lectures, 
2R- £!! •• pp- LI - LII. 
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the eidos of experience, the Lebenswelt. As long as 
Husserl resisted the temptation *0 make of the ego a 
separate thematic object, the transcendental reduction 
stayed clear of the distortion of making the ego a sub-
stantive principle. 
In the Crisis Husserl tried hard to confine his 
discussion of transcendental subjectivity to the dis-
cussion o'f the universal style of gi venness of phenom-
ena, rather than that of a new metaphysical entity. 
To accomplish this end he tried hatd to keep within the 
/ 
constraints of the epoche by directing his attention 
to data given to the consciousness of the theoretical 
attitude. Although he dealt with the universal and 
the particular, he was merely pointing out the univer-
sal aspects of phenomena in the structure of the Lebens-
!!l!~ Husserl concerned himself with what he called 
the "how of the world's manner of givenness, its open 
or implicit intentionalities.,,40 It was only when 
Husserl wrote of transcendental subjectivity as if it 
were a principle of explanation that<it seemed to leave 
the level of phenomena to take on the character of be-
ing a functional prerequisite for their being a univoc-
al world of experience. In this way transcendental 
40 
Husserl, Crisis, .2:2. cit., p. 160. 
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subjectivity is meant to be the meta-level of phenomena 
and not a new ontological substance. 
To emphasize that Husserl never actually studies 
anything other than the particular and universal aspects 
of phenomena in the Crisis, Part III A,:, we will review 
the steps leading to the transcendental reduction. 
Husserl began by directing his thematic attention to 
what was apodictically given to his awareness. These 
data Husserl found in the Cartesian manner to be acts 
of apprehension(cogito) in conjunction with objects of 
apprehension(cogitatum). If an object of apprehension, 
for example a theory, concept, or number could not be 
reproduced in one's experience according to the struc-
ture cogito-cogitatum, it was shown to be a presuppos-
ition (something foreign to the level of phenomena) 
rather than a true datum of experience. That phenomena 
were shown to have this bipolar aspect of "conscious-
ness of" and :"pees8nt before consciousness", led Husserl 
to his eidetic characterization of phenomena as Seins-
geltungen. By studying the universa traits of the to-
tality of Seinsgeltungen, Husserl was able to charac-
terize the universal aspects of the Lebenswelt as ego-
cogito- cogitatym. 1&2 merely represented the universal 
aspects of the Lebenswelt itself - the intentional dir-
ectedness of all phenomena. 
There is a tendency to confuse this ubiquitous 
pole of phenomena with a substantial entity While 
reading the Crisis, because Husserl seems to conceive 
of the functions of human subjectivity and transcendent-
al subjectivity as being parallel. Now, the function 
of human subjectivity in terms of the apprehension of 
an object ought to be a particular example of the un-
iversal objectitying funotienl In Husserl's words, 
"the natural objective world-life is only a particul-
ar mode of transcendental life Which forever consti~ 
tutes the world".41 
We have tried to illustrate in Which aspects 
Husserl's work in the Crisi! explored the subjective 
relative as the basis for objective knowledge and yet 
avoided psychologism. In the next chapter we will ex-
amine whether the methodology of the transcendental 
reduction can be free of psychologism. In particular, 
we will examine the technique of free variation to see 
if it provides adequate access to the universal aspects 
of the data of experience. 
41 
Ibid., p. 175. 
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The question to be answered concerns whether the 
Lebenswelt could be no more than a construction of the 
imagination.. Presumably, the crux: of the transcendent-
al reduction was to show that the Lebenawelt includes 
possibilities of data tOG vast to have been invented 
by an individual person or culture. The Lebenswelt 
was to have!J:bten de:lJ.i'!eated·as:the .. 1lpiYQcaJ.",:Sield of 
experience by horizons of infinite dimensions. In short, 
the Lebenswelt was to account for all particular exper-
iences of individuals and thus was not to be determin-
ed by any particular one. Here we are questioning some-
thing Husserl questioned under the "paradox of Human 
subjectivity." Was the subjectiv':<pole of experienoe 
personal or universal - "Mensch oder letzlich fungier-
!nS! - leistende Subjekt?,,42 
We must discuss whether the Crisis' examination 
of the Lebenswelt was successful in meeting the chal-
lenges of psychologism by assessing. 1. whether free 
variation was an adequate method of exhibiting the un-
iversal dimensions of personal experience, 2. whether 
Husserl had adequate reason for treating personal in-
42 
Husserl, Die Krisis •••• 22. cit., p. 130. 
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tentionality and universal intentionality as parallel 
structures and, finally. 3. whether that phenomenology 
seemed to become epistemology in the Crisis has any 
bearing on the question. 
Paul Ricoeur haa claimed that Husserl always used 
some form of the technique of free variation to make 
the eidetic aspects of experience thematically avail-
able to the phenomenolOgist.43 By means of this method, 
the phenomenologist was able to construct in his imag-
ination a survey of conceivable modifications of what 
was immediately given to his consciousness. To find 
the eidetic traits of an object of awareness, for ex-
ample, one would first modify in every conceivable way. 
the perceivable aspects of the data at hand. In this 
manner, if one could merely imagine an aspect it would 
then be counted as a possible datum of experience Which 
should be somehow "included" in the conoeption of the 
eidos or universal. To arrive at the eides of an ob-
ject of awareness one would eliminate all those conceiv-
able modifications Which were not totally necessary 
for the meaning of an object of awareness. Its oolour. 
Paul Ricoeur. Husserl. An AnalYsis of His Phen-
omenolofi' trans. by Edward G. Ballard and Lester E. 
Embree Evanston. Northwestern University Press, 1972), 
p. 86. 
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size and shape, and position in space and time, would 
then be found not to be eidetic traits of an object 
of awareness because they can be eliminared and there 
can still be s6me sort of object in awareness, In other 
words none of these traits are essential to objectiv-
ity. Husserl believed that the fact that the object 
is given to consciousness and that any objectivity con-
veyed some meaning were two eidetic traits. 
Similarly, the examination of the eidetic traits 
of the aggregate of all conceivable objects, the Lebens-
welt, was accomplished by the technique of free varia-
tion. Only those traits of the world of objects which 
could not be modified by the imaginatio. without chang-
ing the sense of experience could be considered eidet-
ic. Husserl found that the mathematical determinations 
of the world of science could not be considered to be 
eidetic according to this method. Husserl did not con-
sider the fact that all the aspects of objects can be 
reduced to measurable quantities to be the most univer-
sal dimension of the world. Instead, he found the char-
acteristic that no object can be in awareness unless 
its meaning is somehow shaped by all possible objects 
of experience to be more fundamental. 
The debateabll element of this method is not its 
demonstration that experience is not primarily of atomic 
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objects but rather, always takes in a world structure. 
It is rather the presumption that one's imagination 
can have access to universals. A catalogue of all pos-
sible modifications of one's experience could be nothing 
more than a generalization from one's experience. The 
resulting "eidos" would \hen not preclude the doubt 
that it is a false "eternalization" of something which 
is in fact variable. The "universal type" so found, 
would then be conditioned by the particular case of 
one's style of apprehending. Husserl's concept of 
eidos, was supposed to condition the particular case 
in the manner of the relation of type to token. Futher-
more, if the former were the case, the field of possi-
bilities to be considered could then be the fantasy of 
the individual phenomenologist. It would seen that this 
second objection would not be so bothersome to Husserl. 
He could have easily considered the realm of possible 
fancy to be limited by the capacities of intentional-
ity. No fantasy could be an object of awareness unless 
it were also an intentional object. 
The method of free var±ation seemed to assume from 
the start that the eidetic aspects of experience can 
be thematic objects just like any other object. One 
was supposed to be able to confront these traits direc-




tion was conpleted. To do so, the phenomenologist' 
starts from his own posint of view by paying attention 
to the particular object present to his consciousness 
and then somehow moves to a new level of awareness where 
he can confront all possible objectivities at once in 
totality. In the transition he is supposed to find 
that subjectivity is a universal .nstead of a personal 
dimensioo of experience. 
Objectivities generated by the imagination would 
have appeal for the phenomenologist. They seem not to 
be as shaped by contingent aspects of experience such 
as facts and so appear to be akin to the universal as-
pects for which he is looking. Although one can con-
jure up something never seen in watlng life, eg. a pink 
elephant, it is debateable whether one could bring to 
mind something entirely different from what one has 
experienced in the past. In addition. data of the imag-
ination are known to be the direct product of one's 
own subjective operations. For this reason they are 
not only vivid and thus good candidates for apodicity. 
but they are also free from the psychologist doubt that 
they eriginated from the "external world". Yet, "'all 
these advantages did not seem to compensate for the 
basic problem of making the data of fantasy the stan-
dard of all other kinds of objects. In acts of imag-
-38-
ination, objeots appear before consciousness in oorrel-
ation with personal intentions. We now have to examine 
how parallelly Husserl oonceived of oonstitutive acts 
of transoendental subjectivity to those of the intenb 
tional acts of personal Whim. 
Husserl was convinced that subjectivity was ulti-
mately non-personal because the meaning given through 
experience was too extensive and persistent to have 
been invented by one person. Husserl thought the "rat-
ional" of experience of Sinn was pregiven so as to 
make oneis partioular experienoe possible. As Enzo 
Paci expressed it, every relative representation inheres 
in the horizon of the world. 44 What is meant is that 
the sense of a particular phenomenon depends upon its 
cohesion with other phenomena. This tendenoy seems 
self-evident upon observation of the ooherency inher-
ent in the stream of one's presentations to conscious-
ness. Yet what is not so evident is Husserl's conclu-
sion that it is the intentionality of the subjeot that 
strives for the system in every representation. 
Much of the parallelism that seems to result in 
44 
Paoi, The Funotion of the Sciences and the Mean-
ing of Man • .2l?. eit,. p. 82. 
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Husserl's conceptions of the personal subject (empir-
ical subject) and the transcendental(;1subject seem to 
have been the result of his insistence to work with ev-
idence. Personal experience makes good evidence be~ 
cause it is vivid and immediate. Yet personal exper-
'enee can be doubted when it comes to universal matters. 
Both Helmut Kuhn and Enzo Paci agree that the Lebens-
!!!i is meant to delineate the conditions of all actual 
and possible experience.45 For Kuhn, the explication 
of the Lebenswelt would therby include two axes of ex-
planation. It would involve the intersection of the 
scheme of personal attitudes and anticipations with all 
those factors beyon4 the control of the individual. 
It would seem that the principle of the transcendental 
ego is meant to be a third level of explanation which 
accounts for the two in their work of delineating the 
field of the Lebenswel t as being a uni vocali ty of, '"mean-
ing. 
The transcendental subject becomes the subject 
of the objectivating function. Though personal Whims 
actively colour the' meaning of the world for the per-
45 
See, Helmut Kuhn, "The Phenomenological Concept 
of Horizon," Philosophical Essays in Memory of Edmund 
Hpsserl, 22. ctt., p. 120, and Paci, The Function of 
the Sciences snd the Meaning of Man, 22. ctt" p. 82, 
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son, and do effect the presentation of particular phen-
omena, one person cannot actively change the shape of 
the Lebenewelt. In other words, the world constituting 
functions responsible for the Lebenewelt can only in-
correctly be attributed to the human ege. World cons-
titution must in actual fact be an anonymous procedure.* 
For this reason, it was considered by Husserl to have 
been pregiven to all efforts of human apprehension and 
anticipations. The human ego is then passive to the 
"effects" of transcendental subjectivity. 
It is then impossible that the transcendental sub-
ject can be male a thmatic object for the survey of the 
phenomenologist. Yet personal experience does involve 
the intermingling of universal and particulare elements 
such as those about which Kuhn writes. Though the Lebens-
welt is not available to us In its totality as a them-
atic object, we do function in its midst as knoeing 
SUbjects. For this reason, the individual subject must 
be able to passively intuit or "view" these universal 
aspects in the flux of data. TbIt/ only problem is that 
these "essences" are strands in the total fabric of 
* Here we have an example of how the natural at-
titude leads to less of a falsification than the the-
oretical attitude. To the natural attitude, world cons-
titution seems an anonymous prooedure. 
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experience and therefore cannot, without distortion. 
be taken out of context for thematic purposes. 
The pa.radGx Gt human subjectivity seems to be an 
understandable dilemma of the phenomenological method. 
The transcendental subject must be simultaneoust1y sim-
ilar to and different from the human subject. It must 
be similar in order to give the notion of transcendent-
al subjectivity content. Transcendental subjectivity 
must somehow be connected to conorete evidence So that 
it is not thought of as being a theoretical oonstruct. 
However, if it is too similar to human subjectivity 
psycho1ogistic conclusions could be drawn from the phen-
omenological method. 
One wonders whether Husser1 could differentiate 
the results of his method from the pitfalls of ideal-
ism Which Marvin Farber outlined in his essay, "The 
Idea of Fresuppositionless Phi1os0Phy".46 Farber's 
point was that the absolute spirit to Which Husserl's 
letzlich fungierende leistende Subjekt seems similar, 
oan never be proved according to evidence. Rather, 
its necessity must first be demonstrated in order to 
justify thinking it to be absolute. In other words, 
46 
Marvin Farber, "The Idea of Presuppositionless 
Philosophy,'v Philosophic Essays in Memory: of Edmund 
Husserl, ~. cit •• pp. 44 - 45. 
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an argument for the absoluteness of spirit could well 
take the general form I if there were no such principle, 
then we would not experience as we do. Such reasoning, 
as can be seen, can only be loosely based on evidence 
by providing a justification for a present state of ' 
affairs. 
In the case of the Crisis, there seems to be no-
thing there to prevent one from seeing the work as an 
answer to a rhetorical question. Husserl could have 
begun with the assumption that knowledge is directly 
based upon experience. 47 From there he could have de-
From there he could have' 'decided that the uni vocali ty 
of meaning was the form most applicable to experience. 
Finally, he could have seen that this reasoning led to 
the conclusion that the experienceable "world" must 
be informed by a transpersonal universal subjectivity_ 
According to the above outlined argument, Husserl's 
analysis of experience according to evidence could be 
viewed as nothing more that the justification of his 
personal theory. This would then be a highly psycho1-
ogistic reprecussion 
47 
This tact is similar to David Hume's to treat 
concepts not based on incoming data as fictions. See 
David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature. 22- ~_, p. 197. 
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The parallelism between the functioning of the 
human subject, which is thematically available to every 
phenomenologist by means of self reflective acts, and 
the functioning of transcendental subjectivity Which is 
thematically unavailable to us, resulted in a number 
of disturbing confusions. The most confounding of thes 
has to do with the eidetic character of phenomena to 
be meaning givenness (Siungebung). It is difficult to 
know to what aspect of experience "meaning givenness" 
refers. THe meaning of a word might be universal in 
the sense that it is standard, and yet be merely con-
ventional. Husserl, on the other hand, claimed that 
the meaning givenness about which he wrote was univer-
sal in the sense of being prior to experience and the 
principle which makes experience possible. Meaning 
may also have the psychologistic implication of a per-
sonal interpretation or evaluation. Yet, meaning, as 
a translation tif the German term "Sinn", could well 
have the more universal implication of the rational. 
Though the connection between Part I and Part III 
A of the Crisis has not been clearly established, it 
is not improbable to thik that they are linked in some' 
manner. If they were so found, it would be easier to 
understand why Husserl could have kept meaning given-
ness and the difference between the human ego and the 
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transcendental ego ambiguous. In Part I Husserl dis-
cussed the loss of meaning §dr life~' Lebensbedeutsan-
keit48 of the natural sciences and philosophy's trad-
i tional task of struggling for the meaning of mani,~ 
.Sinn,des,Menschen.49 The reader can get the personal 
level of experience mixed up with the eidetic level 
of experience when considering the relation of reason 
and freedom to life. One can construe from Part I. 
that human subjectivity is the seat of reason because 
it is man's rationality which is able to shape life. 50 
Yet this willful shaping of human life according to rea-
son cannot be equivalent to the world constitution of 
the transcendental subject, though Husserl may secret-
ly desired them to be. Part I coupled with Appendix 
Tt. "The Origin of Geometry", reminds one of Kant's 
48 
Husserl, Die Kttsis d!r europaigchen Wissengchaf-
ten und die transzenden~ale Phan!meno1ogie, 2R' cit, 
p. ). 
49 
~., p. 12. 
50 
Husserl, Orisis, ~. ctt., p. 6. 
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beliefs concerning the relation of critical inquiry, 
morality, and autonomy in "What is "Enlightment" .51 
Perhaps by showing the parallelism between transcend-
ental subjectivity and the human subject, Husserl was 
hoping to restore faith in human reason and its capac-
ity to free men from self-incurred tutelage. This 
would be an understandable response to the social and 
political ferment of Germany in the 1920's and 30's. 
Finally we ought to question whether psychologism 
is a criticism possible of phenomenology. As Herbert 
Spiegelberg explained in his article, "Reality-Phenom-
enon and Reality", phenomenology makes no pretense to 
know real~ty. It only strives to study the character 
of the data given to subjectivity.52 Accordingly, 
Spiegelberg believes phenomenology to be tully aware 
that reality may be other or in any case something more 
than what the data seem to inform us that it is. Phen-
f Edmund : '"" 
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omenology, as such a study, could claim that essences 
were among the data of experience without at the same 
time claiming that the source of §inn was 8ubjective. 
Unfortunately, the phenomenology of the Crisis 
is not so straight-forwardly non-epistemological and 
one wonders whether Husserl has opted for an absolute 
ontology of phenomena. He proposed in that work to 
start a science of "the 'unive~sal how of the pregiven-
ness of the world, i.e., of what makes it a universal 
ground for any sort of objeotivity.,,53 The fact that 
Husserl attempted to carry out such an endeavour makes 
his work v ulnerable to the charge of Jsychologism. 
It is true that Husserl did take precautions to ensure 
that the resulting epistemology not be psychologistic. 
The chief one is that of the eR2ch' which remains in 
effect during the phenomenological reductions of the 
Crisis. Transcendental subjectivity is merely the meta-
structure of the aggregate of phenomena. not a new level 
of reality. Husserl tried to show that since phenomena 
can be shown to have universal dimensions, they are 
acceptable candidates for being the basis of objective 
knowledge. This quite a different task from showing 
53 
Husserl, Crisis, 22- £!i •• p. 146. 
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that phenomena are in fact the basis of objective know-
ledge. Such a task would require <;,the suspension of the 
" epgche. 
However. as we have attempted to illustrate here. 
it is often difficult to tell the difference between 
human subjectivity and transcendental subjectivity. 
As a result, Husserl's work in the Crisis very often 
sounds like it is trying to prove that reason has its 
source in human consciousness. This result is largely 
due to the attempt of the transcendental reduction to 
make the Lebenewelt a thematic object for us. It is 
here that the epoche might be considered to have been 
violated. Phenomenological reflection could fool the 
phenomenologist into thinking he had a reality before 
his consciousness. Since human subjectivity is an ob-
ject included in the Lebensw!lt. this task ought to 
be impossible. What we mean here is that all of the 
Lebenswelt may be an object of awareness except for the 
"portion" Which inclUdes the human subject as apprehend-
er. Because of the vectorial directedness of the in-
tentionality of consciousness, one's subjective oper-
ations cannot be made thematic objects to one's aware-
ness. 54 Now the impossibility of having the totality 
54 
See, Jean-Paul Sartre, The Transcendence of the 
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of the Lebenswelt as one thematic object for human 
subjects would by no means prove the subjective pole 
of experience to be non-personal and thus universal. 
A more sympathetio view of Husserl's work in the 
Crisis would be that he never intended the Leb~swelt 
to be reduced to the pole of transoendental subjectiv-
ity, but rather was content that theeido.! of exper-
ience be all that the structure ego-oogitg, ... oogitatum 
implied. Refleotion upon personal experience would 
yield the data of the flux of apprehending aots and 
appearanoes. Yet, by means of a theoretical study suoh 
as phenomenologioal refleotion , we can see that this 
apparent ohaos has the tendency towards two poles of 
organization. The first was the total sense of the 
objeot, oogitatum,which we oan never have in tine ap-
earanoe due to the neoessity that an act of peroeption 
is always determined by a perspeotive. The second is 
the ego or transcendental subject which constitutes 
the world of §ogitationes as a coherent system of mean-
ing. 
By concentrating on the question of whether the 
discussions of the Lebenswelt in Part III A of the Cris,", 
!&2. trans. by Forest Williams and Robert Kirkpatrick 
(New York: Noonday Press, 1957). 
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can be a response to psVchologism. it would seem that 
we have come across the limtations of the phenomenolog-
ical method. We have shown that psychologism is ultimate-
ly a problem for epistemology and metaphysics which 
are both out of the scope of the phenomenological sphere 
of study. We have shown the pAenomenologioal discus-
sions of the Crisis to be more of a prepatory study of 
the problem of psychologism. At best, Husserl could 
only have shown that the aggregate of data possible 
in human experience has a trans-personal universal or-
ganization. He would have to suspend the epooh' to 
give a full account of how subjective experience leads 
to scientific knowledge. In the concluding chapter we 
will discuss thewe limitations of the phenomenological 
method that prevent the Crilis from being a full res-
ponse to psychologism. 
CHAPTER IV. CONCLUSION 
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The positive eontripution of the discussion of 
the transcendental dimensions of the Lebenswelt was 
that it provided an enriched notion of what oonstitu-
ted exact soience for HusserL. The science of essence 
was shown in the Crisis to be based upon the eidetic 
struotures of the Lebenswelt.. Instead of ignoring sub ... 
jective experienoe as do the positive soiences (which 
oan only reveal probabilities for Husserl), by means 
of the oonoept of the Lebenswelt, Husserl strove to re-
veal how intuition of universal truths could be a sub ... 
jective experienoe. During the oourse of this work 
we have tried to examine this venture in terms of how 
well Husserl was able to extricate his study of the 
Lebenswelt from the. oharge of leading to subjeotivis-
tio epistemology. We concede that transoendental phen-
omenology can provide a oonvinoing demonstrationr.~that 
the Lebenswelt has a universal intentional struoture. 
However,''We are uneasy that the methods of transcen-
dental phenomenology seem to hide the vitality of hu-
man experienoe from thematic foous. The phenomenolo-
gist knows he began his study by examing his experience. 
Yet, can he prove that the results of his study are 
not merely theoretical constructs by referring the meta-
l) 
struoture of the Lebenswelt back to his experience: 
After the transcendental reduction has been per-
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formed, we have problems relating the raw material of 
phenomenological study, personal experienoe to the re-
sulting transoendental struotures. The best examples 
of this problem inolude; the relation of evidenoe to 
the eidetio struotures of experienoe, the paradox of 
human subjeotivity, and finally the relation of the 
world of everyday experience to the Lebenswelt. 
Husserl's predileotion for studying the transcend-
ental aspeots of experience never quite corresponded 
to his insistence upon verifioation by self-evidence. 
Both were necessary elements of phenomenological study, 
yet it seemed as if they were often mutually exclusive 
priorities. Husserl thought that if the phenomenologist 
took the proper precautiDns, phenomena would self-evid-
ently show their natures and functional ~fficaoy to re-
flective oonsoiousness. The primary preoaution was to 
eliminate presuppositions about the nature of objeot-
ivity. Husserl believed that presuppositions hid the 
actual working natures of phenomena. espeoially the 
meta-dimension in which he was most interest~d. Pre-
suppositions~«re not based upon phenomena so they al-
legedly had no place in phenomenological study. The 
problem with phenomenological evidence was that it was 
private. The data of my experienoe showed itself be-
fore my. own reflective consoiousness. Yet, the effica-
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cy of the transcendental structure ef the Lebenswelt 
explained that of necessity my experience is similar 
to that of every other human being. 
Husserl, as an antidote, (as I discussed in Chap-
ters II and III), hoped to show that phenomena had a 
formal meta-structure that was universal, without in-
troducing any elements foreign to the phenomenological 
sphere or making the account overly personal. In this 
way Husserl ten.ed to trade off the concrete material 
of his studies, the data of his experience, for the 
meta-structures. However, an account of the universal 
structures too divorced from personal experience could 
be suspect of being itself a presupposition. 
Simi larily , the problem of the paradox of human 
subjectivity was a result of transcendental phenomen-
ology's attempt to avoid the psychologistic dangers 
of being overly personal as well as the other extreme 
of working with theoretical constructs. Husserl was 
well aware that in erder for transcendental phenomen-
ology to have a concrete basis, on some level, the hu-
man subject and the transcendental subject would have 
to refer to the same thing.55 Man as knower would be 
55 
See Husserl, Orilis, ~:" ci;1., p. 202 and Paci, 
The Function of the Siiences and the Meaning of Man, 
sm.. cit ••. p. l39,on ;ichte's conception of the meet-
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the subject for which the Lebenswelt is the object and 
at the same time man would be another phenomena found 
within the dimensions of the Lebenswelt. Since the 
phenomenological method required that 6ne remained with-
/ in the epoche by viewing man as a phenomenon, this meet-
ing point of the empirical subjeot and the the trans-
cendental subject eludes the phenomenologist. Phenom-
enology provided a technique for studying man as a phen-
omenon.:)§nd the meta- structure of phenomena in gener-
a 
al, but has notA methodology for studying the concrete 
man in Whom th. empirical ego could very well be recon-
ciled with the+~Qnscendental subject. The paradox of 
human subjectivity would then only be an apparent par-
adox created by the phenomenological method. That is, 
as long as the epoch' is in force, the paradox remainso 
The third disturbing problem forthe transcendent-
al phenomenology of Part III A of the Crisis is the 
relation 6f the everyday world of 'xperience to the 
LebeUllelt. Phenomenology begins with a reflection 
upon the every day world of experience and ends with 
the Lebenswelt. In the course of this process, the 
epich. is established which prevents the phenomenolo~ 
gist from consi~ririg questions of existential reality 
and its metaphysicso As a result, the phenomenologist 
ing point of the transcendental ego and the empirical ego. 
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seems to have lost the possibility fo relating the 
two "worlds". 
The gap between everyday eaperience and the Lebens-
!!!i ought not to exist. Reflectio~ upon experience 
should bear a relationship to events of everyday life. 
In other words, phenomenological reflection ought not 
to create new structures. Rather it should clarity 
those already operative in human experience. Yet, phen-
omenology is so vulerable to the effects of presuppos-
itions that it resorts to the artificial separation 
" of these two spheres by means of the epoche. Common 
sense would tell us, however, that no position can be 
free of presuppositions.56 
Transcendental phenomenology leaves the critic 
with the feeling that it is a study that is out of pro»-
ortion. Phenomena:h~ye a place in the area of episte-
mological study. Yet phenomenology stUdies the Lebens-
welt in isolation from all other subjects of philosoph-
ical study as if it were vitally important. This is-
olation only increases the illusion of the dispropor-
56 
See Marvin Farber, The Aims Qf PhenomenologY, 
CNeW:!'Yorkl Harper Torchbooks, 1966), on presupposltion-
less philosophy. 
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tional importance of phenomena. Philosophy, of all 
studies ought to have the integrity to be open-ended. 
Finally, many of the problems considered by trans-
oendental phenomenology seem to be caused by its methods. 
In this way, phenomenology can be accused of inventing 
problems and their solutions. For example, before un-
deriaking the phenomenological reduction, one knows 
that world constitution is an anonymous procedure. No 
one can invent the objective world or even the Lebens-
!!li. After the transcendental reduction, it seems 
that the world might have been constituted by the trans-
cendental subject. This doubt is what introduced the 
psychologistic elements that we are questioning in Part 
III A of the Crisis. 
In conclusion, the psychologistic doubt that is 
possible of the findings of Part III A of the Orisis, 
concerning the relationship of transcendental subjec-
tivity to the Lebenswelt, is to think of them as the-
oretical constructions divorced from experience. :.'. \ 
Husserl never wanted to depart from experience in 
the above way, rather he wanted to clarify human ex-
perience. Husserl's goal would be reached if we could 
be ass'ured that the meta- dimensions of the Lebenewel t 
do refer back to experience. 
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